Articles

Special Issue – Isn't all art performed?

Architecture as performance. Sigurd Lewerentz's uncut bricks

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Abstract: Might architecture be reconceived as an art that is performed? David Davies's performance theory claims that all artworks should be considered not as products made by generative performances, but rather as performances themselves. But is architecture, like music, a 'performed work' in Davies's terminology? Davies thinks not, characterising architecture's 'executory performance' as internal to generating an artistic vehicle associated with a physical object. By contrast, I contend that architectural notation performs a dual role: an executory function (facilitating construction) and a role in articulating an artistic statement (thereby establishing its status as art). Here, the architectural 'score' is recast not as a mere 'constraint' but as integral to the creative processes by which architecture establishes an 'artistic statement' and a distinctive 'virtual' realm. I test this position against a late work by Sigurd Lewerentz, arguing that his idiosyncratic imperative not to cut any bricks articulates an artwork every bit as radical as contemporaneous works by conceptual artists.

The brickwork is the first thing one notices when visiting Sigurd Lewerentz's Church of Sankt Petri, located in the small town of Klippan in Skåne, Sweden (fig. 1). The hard Helsingborg bricks are used for walls, floors, vaulted ceilings, fixed furniture and the altar (figs. 2, 3). Not only are the intrinsic material qualities of the hand-picked bricks exemplified through their ubiquitous use, but the bricks and mortar form a tactile continuous surface. As the architectural critic Peter Blundell Jones writes, the walls are made with wide, uneven joints, such that '[t]he pointing is not raked or trowelled as

Figure 1: Sigurd Lewerentz, Church of Sankt Petri, west facade

usual but "bagged off", crudely wiped with an old sack, causing the bricks to be smeared'.[1] Lewerentz instructed his bricklayers not to clean up – to work in a 'messier' way than they were accustomed to. This does not imply imprecision: Lewerentz would frequently ask for brickwork to be redone if it failed to meet his exacting demands. Rather, it gives the walls a texture reminiscent of local rural architecture. Yet as Blundell Jones continues (fig. 4):

> From time to time this texture is relieved by another in acute contrast: a pure semi-reflective plane of glass with a perfect silver edge, evidently applied to the outside of the wall. Its delicate form is held in position by the crudest means: a bracket in each corner secured with two screws. This window in St Peter's Church Klippan, by Sigurd Lewerentz, is a favourite with architects, for once seen it is never forgotten; but it is only imitated by the brave.[2]

From the inside, looking out, it is as though there is no frame or glass. From the outside, at certain times of the day the unframed windows, with their radiant silver edges, take on reflective properties at striking odds with the tactility of the smeared brickwork.

As memorable as these windows are, they are eclipsed by Lewerentz's idiosyncratic rule that might be said to have necessitated their invention.

Figure 2: Rooflight details

There is no architectural precedent for his dictate that 'no brick be cut'. The only exception is the altar, the floor surrounding the altar, and the pulpit, where a half-brick is used, but split, counterintuitively – and with difficulty – lengthways. Lewerentz's rule is neither a rational nor functional imperative, and at times leads to some odd solutions (fig. 2). The exceptionally wide and irregular horizontals required the mortar to be reinforced with ground slate to give them a concrete-like strength; their width is partly accidental, in that the wrong bricks arrived on site, Lewerentz having initially worked out dimensions on the basis of a larger module that was not available in the chosen brick.[3] As Blundell Jones notes, '[t]he effect is often crude and messy, almost shockingly so in places, and carried through with utter ruthlessness'.[4] But this is testament to the extraordinary lengths that Lewerentz went to in order to resolve the three-dimensional puzzle he sets himself at every junction. It required an almost daily presence on site and an intense working relationship with the foreman Carl Sjöholm, with frequent modifications requiring additional drawings. The notoriously reticent Lewerentz, who was in his eighties when the building was completed in 1966, was silent about an imposition that no ordinary client would have countenanced (though even the Lutherans who commissioned Lewerentz grew frustrated at the delays). Fortunately, we have access to some of the copious detail drawings generated by Lewerentz and his assistant Michel Papadoupolos, necessitated by a rule, which – in choreographing every brick – far exceed any constructional

necessity. That so many of these drawings were completed after the initial construction phases underlines the improvisational nature of the performance of Lewerentz's 'score'. And as we shall see, the most explicit revealing of was not even part of the original design. A later amendment, the rule evolved after much of the structure was completed, it is central to the extraordinary way function and symbol intersect in Lewerentz's architecture.

Figure 3: The altar

I.   INTRODUCTION

As one of the more 'stable' art forms, architecture presents particular difficulties in categorising it as an art that is 'performed'. Not least, not all buildings are works of art; as Nelson Goodman states: 'A building is a work of art only insofar as it signifies, means, refers, symbolises in some way'.[5] But even when architecture functions as art (or, better, an architectural practice functions as an art practice), there is the problem of locating who – or what – is doing the performing. Architecture, necessarily, is a collective (even adversarial) enterprise; not only is it a 'two-stage' art, involving design and construction stages, but its overlapping phases of production can last months, or even years.[6] Such regulated processes of production involve mediation by many hands, most of which do not bear upon the building's status as artwork. Of course, this 'executory' feature is not unique to architecture; it is something architecture shares with other complex two-stage art forms, such as opera and theatre. Nevertheless, operatic and theatrical performances are distinguished

by being – uncontroversially – performance events, typically 'live' and constrained by a score or script. They are but one of a class of performances, such that the identification of the work can be distinguished from each instance of its staging. As Susanne Langer puts it, they are occurrent arts.[7] By contrast, architecture lacks such occurrence, in that even when replicated, as a constructed 'thing in the world' architecture remains 'durable and physically present'.[8]

Given this enduring physical presence, it is not surprising that what architectural theorist Stan Allen labels the 'conservative' position locates aesthetic meaning solely in the experience of the building as built.[9] In philosophical terms, this is consistent with an aesthetic empiricism (as characterised by Gregory Currie and David Davies) that in its 'enlightened' form proposes that the primary factor in fixing the artistic properties of an artwork is the immediate – albeit suitably informed – experience of the work as realised.[10] Now a performance theory of art, such as that proposed by Davies in his 2004 book *Art as Performance*, sets itself up against such an empiricist view where 'artistic value is essentially a matter of the kind of experience elicited in us through such an experiential encounter'.[11] Davies's contention is not only that such accounts are found wanting when faced with the diversity of contemporary art practices (often denying their status as art), but that they misrepresent what is going on in traditional art. Problems arise for the empiricist view 'when we consider how our beliefs about the history of making of an object bear upon the appreciation of, and the ascription of artistic value to, the work we take to be in some sense embodied in that object'.[12] Davies, by contrast, proposes the ontological claim that *all* artworks – including architecture – be identified with the actions or processes that produced them rather than their vehicles or products. The artwork just is the act of specifying a focus of appreciation, thus articulating a content that comprises not just the vehicle itself, but related contextual information and a set of shared understandings – an 'artistic medium' – by which the vehicle expresses such content.

Putting to one side criticisms of Davies's theory, and whether its insights might be accommodated within the remit of the aesthetic contextualism he critiques, let us grant the feasibility of his argument.[13] So how might such a performance theory be applied to architecture? This question is complicated by Richard Wollheim's observation that 'it is debatable to what [ontological] category [architecture's] works belongs', in that it is not always clear whether buildings are 'individuals' or 'types'.[14] Are they to be taken as *physical objects* (like paintings and carved sculptures) or *structure-types* (like novels, poems, and musical works)? This has consequences for answering what is and what is not aesthetically relevant to a work of architecture: 'Are the building materials, or the hidden methods of construction, or the site, or the finish, essential properties of the work of architecture, or are they merely properties of this or that building which happens to instantiate the work as a token does a

Figure 4: 'From time to time this texture is relieved by another' (p. 29)

type?'[15]

This confusion of category also has consequences for Wollheim's 'criticism as retrieval'.[16] Indeed, Davies brings out something of the difference in where we must look to retrieve a work's creative processes: 'if, like Wollheim, we take artworks to be essentially contextualized entities whose appreciation is a matter, *inter alia*, of "retrieval" whereby we locate the artwork in its history of making', then with an 'individual' work a copy will not count as an instance of the work because unlike an original painting it lacks this embedded history of making; this is to be contrasted with 'types', where an 'epistemic' instance can stand independently of how it came to have certain manifest properties, such that each performance event can be treated as ' "equally legitimate" renditions of a given artwork'.[17] We do not measure a performance against 'established performances of a musical or theatrical work in order to tell whether it is a manifestation of the work':[18]

> In music, we can again distinguish between those manifestations of the work that stand in an appropriate causal-intentional relation to the prescriptive act of the composer and those that do not. But while we have a historical link between certain manifestations and the compositional activity of the composer, it is the score that guides the performers, and not the performances themselves, that plays the role [of constituting a history of making that bears upon attempts at 'retrieval'].[19]

Here, repeatability is built into the 'work concept', despite its existing 'independently of its particular performances'.[20] And for Davies, the work, thus considered, is a 'piece of human invention "initiating" the work, where this act of initiation is embedded in a historically and culturally specific set of performative and appreciative practices'.[21]

So, given its use of notation, might an architectural 'score' (digital or analogue dimensioned/notated plans, sections, elevations, plus scaled projections) likewise be conceived as just such a piece of human invention? Any attempt to answer this question in light of a performance theory of art is hindered by the fact that Davies's own position on architecture remains unclear. The highly mediated nature of architectural construction would appear to rule out a straightforward analogy with his construal of *individual* paintings or sculptures as 'event-like' entities. These are typically generated by a single artist, such as Agnes Martin's *Falling Blue* (1963) with its dense grid of lines acting as an indexical trace of Martin's generative performance.[22] And yet, in one of only two references to architecture in *Art as Performance*, Davies refers to architecture's 'executory "performance" ' as being 'internal to the process of generating the artistic vehicle', something he claims it shares with film.[23] With film, however, the executory performance – encompassing many creative and technical processes – generates a production artefact that is a precondition for its multiple tokens (i.e. the screenings of the film).[24] With

architecture the implication is that the executory performance generates an artistic vehicle that is taken as a physical object in a 'process analogous to the one whereby early Renaissance paintings were produced by artists working under the supervision of a principal artist and to the specifications of one who commissioned the painting'.[25]

If this is a correct reading of Davies, then his notion of the executory performance of architecture is contrasted not only to film (with its production artefact), but to performance-events typical of the performed arts 'that are performances of performed works [such as *Hamlet, Swan Lake*, and Elgar's Cello Concerto]'.[26] For instance, a musical composition, like any other artwork, constitutes 'a generative performance', but one that must be completed by a focus of appreciation external to this generative act: i.e. a performance of the work. The difference is worth pursuing. Given that 'many of the properties of a dramatic or musical work relevant to its appreciation are properties only realized through *performances* of the work, what the artist produces must bear in some essential way on these performances'.[27] For Davies (distinguishing his position from Goodman's notoriously tight constraints on a 'correct' performance), a *legitimate* performance must be consistent not only with the score, but other 'non-explicit understandings as to how the [. . .] score is to be interpreted for the purposes of performance of the work'.[28]

Such a relation between performance and score is not something that Davies appears to consider for architecture. In allocating architecture's executory performance to the generation of the physical vehicle the work of architecture is not considered one of a class of performances (nor even a single performance) that *mediates* our appreciation of a performed work – associated with the design – standing independently of this realisation. While the vehicular medium might be conceived as encompassing various processes by which physical material is manipulated through the construction processes, Davies emphasises the executory enacting of specifications over any notion of *interpretation* of an architectural 'score'. But, as Davies would no doubt acknowledge, this raises the question of how the constraints represented by architecture's sophisticated notational system enter into the identity of the work.

So where does this leave us? While Davies emphasises the generative processes of the artefact rather than its artefactuality, the upshot is to regard architecture's design processes as normative conditions of a work's construction. And yet such a position has long been contested within architectural education. As Allen notes in his 1989 essay 'Mapping the Unmappable: On Notation':

> In both recent and more distant history, there have been those who claim that the sense of a work of architecture, like music or poetry, resides in the design rather than in the realised building. The architect's intentions, they argue, are expressed in their most

direct form through notation, set down once and for all in the abstract geometries of the drawing. In this view, architecture can only be diminished by the exigencies of construction, compromised by the complexity of the realisation and the unpredictability of reality.[29]

For Allen, such an 'experimental position' faces the problem of locating architectural practice on the 'slippery ground of representation'.[30] Nevertheless, Allen reminds us that with architecture the history of making must encompass both the 'speculative' processes of design and the 'material' practices that transform matter into built form 'through the intermediary of abstract codes such as notation, projection or calculation'.[31]

And here, we might note a similarity between Allen's argument and Davies's claim that '[t]o appreciate works as Wollheimean types is just to appreciate *what was done* in two senses: (1) it is to appreciate what manifest properties can be possessed by right tokens [. . .] having the relevant causal history, and (2) it is to appreciate what was done in establishing the preconditions (for example, the generation of a production-artefact [as with film] or the composition of a score) for that causal history to take place'.[32] So one wonders why, given its compliance with a notational system, Davies does not at least consider architecture a 'performed work' (which, as we shall see in the next section, Goodman contemplates – though not unequivocally). Indeed, as Goodman notes, the fact that 'the compliance-class of a set of [architectural] plans happens so often to consist of but one building' is ontologically beside the point since architectural works can be both single or multiple (typical of housing).[33] In either case it is the 'score' – along with non-explicit shared understandings embedded within architectural practice – that determines legitimate instances of the work. Davies, however, appears to share Wollheim's doubts about categorising architecture as a type (if not the latter's stipulation that every work belonging to the same art should belong to the same category).[34] However, as we shall see in the next section, on at least one definition of Goodman's well-known distinction between autographic and allographic arts, an allographic work might in some circumstances be categorised as an *individual* work rather than a *type*. This recasts Goodman's distinction not in terms of categorising the various arts, but in terms of different histories of production that recognise architecture's distinctive two-stage process. To appreciate an *individual* work of architecture is also just to appreciate *what was done* in two senses: (1) it is to appreciate what manifest properties can be possessed by a physical vehicle having the relevant causal history (in circumstances such as where an unrepeatable performance mediates our appreciation of a performed work, or an architectural intervention into a unique piece of existing architecture), and (2) it is to appreciate what was done in establishing the preconditions (the architectural 'score') for that causal history to take place.

Whether repeatable or not, I want to argue that an appropriate causal-intentional relation to the creative act of the architect(s) as artist(s) is thus, at least in certain circumstances, mediated through something akin to the *interpretation* of a notational score in music (rather than merely an 'executory' performance).[35] And such circumstances, I want to argue are the very ones where we tend to regard the work of architecture as a work of art, or better yet, the product of an architectural practice functioning as an art practice. Lewerentz's Sankt Petri, with its combination of *in situ* improvisations and excess notations is one such example.

Indeed, one might even think that this interpretation of architectural notation operates as a kind of excess to the executory role architectural notation undoubtedly plays – an excess that facilitates, for instance, a Goodmanian notion of exemplification, whether literal or metaphoric.[36] Given that many of the aesthetic properties of architecture relevant to its appreciation are properties only realised through its construction and subsequent use, we might say that the focus of appreciation here oscillates between its notation and the realised structure, with the former crucial to articulating an artistic statement and, hence, establishing its status as art. Architectural notation, thus conceived, performs parallel functions: it facilitates (1) the physical realisation of an architectural object that fulfils contractual obligations and 'primary functions' and (2) what Timothy Binkley (more about him later) refers to as indexed acts of 'piece-specification', whereby sets of meanings or values are conferred upon objects or structures.[37] And as with music – and, even more so, with dance – the relation between notation and performance varies. While architectural notations are rarely considered *pure improvisation* or *improvisational composition*, one can readily conceive of equivalences to Davies's categories of *improvisational interpretation* (one might think of the 'self-build houses' based on Walter Segal's modular construction system as offering a framework for improvisation).

However, there is something amiss here. A consideration of Lewerentz's building highlights the one-sidedness of Davies's wider performance theory of art. Although he acknowledges circumstances where 'a physical engagement with the vehicle is necessary in order to determine what is being articulated', he largely omits the consideration of the situatedness of the encounter that context-dependent artworks afford.[38] I will therefore attempt to reconcile insights afforded a performance theory with an aesthetics of reception, whereby the situated encounter with the physical building is seen as essential not only to the critical retrieval of any given architectural performance, but to how the building choreographs the beholder's movement through space (as remarked upon by Goodman). Here, the performative activity of the beholder involves orientating herself (using embedded cues) towards both built reality – crucial not only to the building's primary functioning but to the appreciation of the work's construction and siting – and the artwork as 'semblance'. Architectural 'scores' are vital to the work's critical retrieval. Moreover, they cannot be re-

cast as mere 'constraints' to the processes of construction (as with Goodman's emphasis on a *compliance class* of objects), since they are integral to the very creative processes by which architecture establishes an 'artistic statement' (in Davies's sense) and a distinctive 'virtual' realm (in Langer's sense).[39] Constituting a set of instructions, they establish a necessary relation between the organising 'idea' and the manipulation of a physical medium by leaving 'a trace on the construction'.[40] The architectural score thus constitutes an act of indexing in a double sense: it performs a locative function in orientating us towards the building (and its virtual realm), whereby we might retrieve the creative processes of its history of making and experience its choreographed spaces; but it also fixes an architectural practice as an art practice.

II.   REVISITING THE ALLOGRAPHIC/AUTOGRAPHIC DISTINCTION

How might this dual role for architectural notation be reconciled with Goodman's allographic/autographic distinction? This was first introduced in *Languages of Art* in relation to the issue of forgery:

> 'Let us speak of a work as *autographic* if and only if the distinction between original and forgery of it is significant; or better, *if and only if even the most exact duplication of it does not thereby count as genuine*'.[41]

This definition is refined in a later version in *Of Mind and Other Matters*, where Goodman states: 'What distinguishes an allographic work is that identification of an object or event as an instance of the work depends not at all upon how or when or by whom that object or event was produced.'[42] In other words, the specific history of production must be considered in a singular work such as Martin's *Falling Blue*, though in the case of Elgar's Cello Concerto's multiple instances, it is not. Accordingly, even a lacklustre performance counts as an authentic instance, provided it complies with its score.

In *Languages of Art*, however, Goodman introduces a second definition, distinguishing between allographic arts involving some form of notation (a score or a script) such as music, dance and drama, and autographic arts, such as painting and sculpture, which typically do not.[43] Jerrold Levinson challenges Goodman's view that the two definitions are extensionally equivalent, arguing that they do not coincide because of 'a simple consequence of the failure of any existing artwork to be notationally identifiable'.[44] Levinson contends that poems and musical compositions:

> turn out to be just as historically tethered as paintings, prints, and sculptures. The difference is not, contra Goodman, that 'history of production' is irrelevant to genuineness in the former arts. How a copy or performance has come about is as relevant to its

authenticity as the provenance of an impression is to its belonging to a given print. The difference is rather that, in poetry and music, the notationality of structure permits genuine duplication without theoretical limit, and secondly, the origination conditions for genuineness are hardly ever in question and so are easily – though mistakenly – overlooked.[45]

Figure 5: The vaulted roof structure

Levinson is not arguing that notationality does not mark an important difference among the arts. Instead, he puts forward an alternative definition of the allographic/autographic distinction where we distinguish works of art as autographic *iff* 'the identity of genuine instances of the work is *not at all* determined by identity of character in a notation or compliance with a character in a notation'.[46] By contrast, 'in allographic arts, identity is partially determined notationally, and directly transcribed duplicates can be genuine'.[47] Levinson's realignment of the allographic/autographic distinction has important consequences for architecture, which under Levinson's definition must be thought of as an allographic art. But let us first consider how Goodman himself characterises architecture as an anomalous or 'mixed' case.

In his brief discussion of architecture in *Languages of Art*, Goodman concedes that the particular combination of drawing and text, numerals and symbols of the architectural plan potentially 'counts as a digital diagram and as a score'.[48] They are not mere sketches (autographic representations) or

scripts but notational instructions for the construction of a building that can potentially be repeated elsewhere. Hence, Goodman concedes that architecture might justifiably be categorised as allographic, since its notational system could potentially be used to replicate buildings, and is therefore capable of multiple instances. As noted earlier (but to expand the citation), Goodman argues:

> We must not be misled by the fact that the compliance-class of a set of plans happens so often to consist of but one building; or by the preeminent interest or value that a given instance of an architectural work may have; or by the emphasis sometimes laid upon immediate supervision, by the architect, of the process of construction [something we have encountered with Lewerentz]. Many a composition is played only once; and a building or performance executed under the direction of the designer or composer, while a more personal product and perhaps much better (or much worse) than another building or performance from the same plans or score, is not therefore a more authentic or original instance of the work.[49]

Nonetheless, Goodman concludes that 'the work of architecture is not always as surely disengaged from a particular building as is a work of music from a particular performance'.[50] Not least, as we have seen there are works of architecture that, perhaps because of their site-specificity, or their particular circumstances of production, cannot be repeated without constituting a 'copy'. Some works of architecture, such as unit housing, might therefore be considered truly allographic (subject to repetition), while, at least according to Goodman, some are autographic (because their particular history of production is tied not just to the 'score' but to an unrepeatable constructional event). Thus, for Goodman, we are 'not as comfortable about identifying an architectural work with a design rather than a building as we are about identifying a musical work with a composition rather than a performance'; therefore, architecture, 'insofar as its notational language has not yet acquired full authority to divorce identity of work in all cases from particular production', is 'a mixed and transitional case'.[51]

But what if we adopt Levinson's revised definition instead? With allographic arts such as music, not only is identity only *partially* determined notationally, but such a categorisation reflects established conventions of musical practice. By extension, this might therefore be said to be true of architecture, where compliance with notation is likewise historically tethered (not least in terms of viability of historic construction techniques). On Levinson's definition, architecture cannot be autographic (though it might integrate autographic elements) given that its identity is, at least partially, determined by the legitimate compliance with architectural plans. Just as some prints

are categorised as autographic, even though they are also types, works of architecture, whether types or individual works, might (like performances) be categorised as allographic. But such an argument becomes more convincing if we shift the discussion away from issues of identity to a consideration of the practice of architecture

III. TOWARDS A PERFORMANCE THEORY OF ARCHITECTURE

Despite any criticism of Davies's notion of architecture's executory performance, his wider performance theory of art offers two correctives to Goodman's account of architecture. Indeed, Davies grounds at least part of his theory of art as performance on aspects of Goodman's argument. This is not surprising, given that 'Goodman argues that arthood is not so much a matter of what a thing is – what properties it possesses – as of what a thing *does*, the function that it performs in a given context'.[52] For Davies, this sense that an artwork's status 'is something that an object possesses only when it functions as a symbol of a certain kind' distinguishes Goodman's position from other functionalist definitions which 'tend to classify things in terms of how they usually function, or how they were designed to function'.[53] And Goodman explicitly applies this to architecture, when he writes: 'A building is a work of art only insofar as it signifies, means, refers, symbolizes in some way'.[54] And the primary way Goodman argues that architecture symbolises is by exemplification.[55] When a work of architecture refers, it does so relative to properties exemplified in the sense of being typical of, or epitomising, certain features – such as an exemplar of a structural system, material or spatial typology. If possession is intrinsic, then this kind of reference, by being exemplary of how such properties are integrated into a replete architectural system, is not. And thus, by virtue of functioning as a symbol by exemplifying such gathered properties, a work of architecture functions as a work of art.[56]

But for Davies, symbolic functions are neither performed independently of a work's history of making nor independently of a background of shared understandings. Goodman's position fails to acknowledge that art is essentially institutional; however, for Davies, institutional must be categorised in the *right* way. He maintains that a performance 'articulates a content through a vehicle via an "artistic medium"', a term Davies uses to describe 'a system of articulatory understandings in a system of the artworld, in something like Danto's sense'.[57] Rejecting 'institutional theory' definitions of 'the Artworld', which describe a broad social institution *conferring* the status of an 'artefact' as art, Davies asserts that an artistic medium is a set of shared understandings 'in virtue of which the manipulation of a vehicular medium may issue in a vehicle which articulates a content in virtue of functioning as an "aesthetic" symbolic in something like Goodman's sense'.[58] This recasts Goodman's account not as

> providing conditions under which we have an artwork, but as pro-
> viding conditions under which a practice of making counts as a
> practice of *artistic* making. So construed, what Goodman clari-
> fies is the conditions under which a set of shared understandings
> counts as an *artistic medium*, so that vehicles generated by agents
> who rely upon those understandings in articulating a content are
> rightly taken to articulate artistic statements.[59]

Davies denies that – unlike Goodman's unreconstructed position – this
constitutes a functionalist definition of an artwork, stating that 'something
is an artwork in virtue of its being an articulative performance that takes
place within such a system [of the artworld], not in terms of functioning as an
"aesthetic symbol" to a greater sense than things which are not artworks'.[60] In
other words, Davies distinguishes those functions conferred upon an artwork
independently of its history of making from the symbolic functions *integral
to the articulation of an artistic statement* within the context of such a set of
shared understandings. He therefore proposes a 'procedural' definition, but
one that conceives of the notion of 'institutional' in a broad way, embodied
in actual practices and a community of receivers.[61] And usefully for my
own position, it potentially ties Goodman's notion of exemplification – the
primary way architecture means – to the articulation of an artistic statement
as manifest by the architectural 'score'.

Here, we might again reference Binkley, who refers to works of art as
indexed acts of 'piece-specification'.[62] Davies states that for Binkley '[p]iece-
specification is *intensional*, because what are specified as pieces are not ob-
jects or structures per se, but sets of meanings or values conferred upon ob-
jects or structures through the very act of piece-specification'.[63] These mean-
ings are dependent upon historical circumstances, and someone like Donald
Judd – author of 1965 essay 'Specific Objects' – evolves radically new ways of
working. Davies adopts Binkley's claim that '[w]hat counts as a work of art
must be discovered by examining the practice of art', in that, like philosophy,
art 'is a cultural phenomenon, and any particular work of art must rely heav-
ily upon its artistic and cultural context in communicating its meaning'.[64]
For Binkley, an artwork just 'is a piece indexed within conventions of this
practice, and its being an artwork is determined not by its properties, but
by its location in the artworld'.[65] The properties do not confer an indexed
piece's status as artwork, but they are used to say *what* the work is in that
'[t]o make a work of art is to use a medium to join together literal physical
qualities and created aesthetic qualities'.[66] But importantly it is the artist's –
not the institution's – activity or performance that is relevant; while this ad-
mits works in the Duchampian tradition that are deliberately non-aesthetic,
'[t]he tools of indexing are the languages of ideas, even when the ideas are
aesthetic'.[67]

Thus conceived, architectural notation is likewise not just a means to

transform plans and sections into built reality, but *the means to evolve a practice of architecture that might legitimately count as a practice of artistic making.* Moreover, as Allen suggests, architectural notations leave tangible traces on the construction, the residue of spatial/temporal relations that while virtual (they cannot necessarily be directly perceived but only inferred) inform our perceptual experience of the resulting architecture; as Allen states, '[i]n the passage from drawing to building, the real and the virtual will always be present in some unpredictable mixture'.[68] This is not to deny that architectural drawings cannot, in their own right, be the focus of appreciation. Indeed, unrealised projects play a key part in the history of architecture, such as Mies van der Rohe's seminal 1924 drawing of a brick country house. I rather aim to emphasise architectural notation's role in blending 'artistic statement' and a distinctive 'virtual' realm. Unlike paintings, architectural drawings are, as Allen suggests, 'neither an end in themselves [. . .] nor are they simply transparent technical instruments'.[69] And crucially, it is the artistic vehicle itself that affords cues as to the role an ambulant beholder must play in *retrieving* such a generative performance. This is consistent with what I have argued elsewhere as the locative function of art, which provides 'indexical cues as to the position the beholder must adopt in order to place herself in the requisite experiential connection to the work's meaning'.[70] But while a factor in all art, it is particularly pertinent to architecture, which, as Goodman notes, cannot be perceived as a whole, but requires the receiver to move, sequentially, through its 'choreographed' internal and external spaces (relying on memory and imagination to orientate ourselves).

My main point is that there are different performances at play here, enacted through the work's two stages of production (constrained, but also facilitated by the detailed drawings and instructions of the architectural score), and enacted by the beholder: the latter conceived both as a spatially-situated retrieval of the creative process, and a performance choreographed by the architecture, whereby the beholder orientates himself/herself towards the work as both functional object and 'semblance'. As the appropriate artistic vehicle, it is the performed building itself that offers cues as to how the beholder might 'complete' the work through her anticipated and activated presence; nevertheless, it is the residue of the originating architectural score – constructing spatial relations experienced across separated spaces – that establishes architecture's distinctive virtual realm.

IV.   THE BEHOLDER'S PERFORMANCE

Lewerentz was an important forerunner of Brutalism. Outside of Sweden, his work was championed by Reyner Banham, author of the 1966 *The New Brutalism*.[71] However, as Colin St. John Wilson notes, this designation of Lewerentz as a proto-Brutalist contains only a half truth, in that this intensely private architect was driven not by association with any group or manifesto,

Figure 6: Gutter detail on east facade of Parish offices

but by the internal necessity of the available resources. According to St. John Wilson, 'What for lesser mortals is called "detail" was for him a means of heightening and transfiguring the day-to-day'.[72] Lewerentz is therefore an ideal candidate to explore Goodman's notion of exemplification as an intensification of properties possessed. In so doing, Lewerentz transfigures ostensibly ordinary details, nowhere more manifest than the sets of meanings or values conferred upon that most ubiquitous of objects, the brick.

As noted earlier, Lewerentz and Papadoupolos produced copious detail drawings, which in fixing the position of every brick far exceeded any constructional necessity. Not only is Lewerentz's rule about uncut bricks manifest in the way the building looks, but it is made apparent in such a manner as to reveal the constitutive role of the 'performance' of this rule. Here, exemplification, as possession (of certain properties) *plus* reference, is not merely a question of the intrinsic properties of the bricks (i.e. possession *without* reference), but how these properties are made visible through their juxtaposition as individual units within a 'sea' of mortar. Through both drawing and improvisation on site, such properties are made apparent in such a way that at every junction we are forced to reflect upon the three-dimensional resolution to the problem Lewerentz's instruction presents (fig. 2), prompting acts of ideation in a way that most brick buildings simply do not.[73] Here, bricks symbolise in such a way as to not only exemplify the inherent material and structural properties, through an intensification prompted by their ubiq-

uitous use, but to emphasise the very process of the structure's rule-bound constructional logic.

I want to argue that this constitutes a performed work involving both interpretation and improvisation. As Janne Ahlin notes:

> Lewerentz' drawings were a story unto themselves. Many revisions and explanatory drawings reached the contractors office. They were not easy to understand, and Lewerentz had to instruct further as to how they were to be read.[74]

Importantly, such acts of piece-specification encompass not only what is said, or specified, but what is left unstated or unexplained. This compels the beholder to find connections and relations for what is intentionally disconnected, through acts of ideation constrained by the work. Writing on literature, Wolfgang Iser claims that the 'iconic signs of literature constitute an organisation of signifiers which do not serve to designate a signified object, but instead designate *instructions* for the *production* of the signified'.[75] The recipient's ideational, performative activity is thus prescribed within the work, but only comes to full fruition through the recipient's imagination. As Iser notes, 'it is the recipient's performance that endows the semblance with its sense of reality'.[76] With architecture, that performance is both enacted and choreographed by the architecture and the critical retrieval of its history of production.

What counts as a work of art is therefore discovered not only through recovering the 'practice' of its construction – how the building exemplifies its own inherent structural logic – but the decision making and wider associational images this imparts. Goodman likewise claims that exemplification of structure, in particular, makes visible the 'build' of the building.[77] Lewerentz's Church of Sankt Petri is exemplary in this regard, allying its structural solution to various aspects of liturgy. This is manifest in the extraordinary structural solution to the church's square plan. Unlike the linear basilica form of Lewerentz's earlier Markuskyrkan, Sankt Petri responds to the principle of an open circle (reminiscent of the early church), where the congregation surrounds the performance of the sacraments. Faced with the problem of how to span the space with his desired brick vaults, Lewerentz utilised a doubled-up steel T-shape column, that in turn supports two doubled-up cross beams that hold up the complex roof of irregular sloping brick vaults. Colin St. John Wilson refers to their subtle undulations as metaphoric of the rise and fall of the breath (fig. 5).[78] Out of structural necessity, Lewerentz devised a novel solution that in its associations fuses literal and metaphorical exemplification. As St. John Wilson notes, this demonstrates a 'strange instinct by which Lewerentz, apparently concerned only with a dogged working-out of an issue in terms of building construction, at last arrived at a figure pregnant with symbolic meaning'.[79]

Figure 7: 'where the language of water and brick poetically coincide.' (p. 47)

This transformation of ordinary architectural detail is also echoed in Lewerentz's handling of water run-off, another ostensibly functional problem raised to the level of performance – made visible in the final architecture. There is an astonishing diversity of solutions adopted, where the pragmatic requirement to throw off water (an obsession apparent in Lewerentz's wider oeuvre) is transformed into something extraordinary (fig. 6). But there is one feature of the interior of the church where the language of water and brick poetically coincide (fig. 7). As Blundell Jones writes, 'the baptismal trough at the corner where one enters [is] a primeval slot, a water-filled fissure, the edge of which swells up mysteriously'.[80] Blundell Jones is absolutely right to use the verb to 'swell', implying, as it does, a process apparently still in progress. Lewerentz here enacted an extraordinary blend of metaphor, symbol and everyday pragmatics. An improvisational design solution that deviated from the working plans, Lewerentz was reputedly inspired by the story in Exodus 17:6, where Moses is instructed to smite a rock with his staff and water emerges out of the resulting fissure. The pool continues, unseen, under the raised mound of bricks. The giant tropical shell that acts as a font, which is incidentally a feature of other Lutheran churches, makes explicit reference to early Christian representations showing Christ baptised by John the Baptist with a scallop shell, and the continuous double drip of this constantly filling and overflowing shell permeates the darkened space. As Blundell Jones notes: 'Baptism is the resounding theme: the space of the church is cave-like and intimate, more sanctuary than celebration, a place of deep mystery rather than stark protestant clarity'.[81] And yet the dripping water is supplied not by an elegant spout, but by a shockingly functional copper tube, strapped to the steel frame that supports the large shell. Again, the day-to-day is transfigured in such a way as to provoke associations that unite symbol with utilitarian solution, expression with literal exemplification. And in opening up this fissure within the ground, the bricks incongruously protruding out at either end, Lewerentz reveals – in its most explicit manifestation – the rule about uncut bricks, almost as if the idiosyncratic rule applied to the entire building was designed for this one moment of revelation as the ground beneath our feet metaphorically opens up.[82]

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NOTES

[1] Blundell Jones 2002, 159.

[2] Blundell Jones 2002, 159.

[3] Ahlin 1987, 167.

[4] Blundell Jones 2002, 166.

[5] Goodman 1985, 643.

[6] Goodman 1968, 113-115.

[7] Langer 1953, 121.

[8] Allen 2000, 34.

[9] Allen 2000, 31.

[10] Currie 1989, Davies 2004. For a partial defence of a moderate version of aesthetic empiricism, see Lamarque 2010.

[11] Davies 2004, 7.

[12]Davies 2004, 13.
[13]See, for instance, Levinson 2016.
[14]Wollheim 1980, 175.
[15]Wollheim 1980, 176.
[16]Wollheim 1980, 185-204.
[17]Davies 2010, 413, 415.
[18]Davies 2010, 414.
[19]Davies 2010, 413-414.
[20]Davies 2018, 49.
[21]Davies 2018, 62.
[22]See Wilder 2020, ch. 9.
[23]Davies 2004, 232.
[24]Davies 2018, 62.
[25]Davies 2004, 232. Davies uses this analogy with respect to a Damien Hirst 'spot' painting, but the analogy appears to be extended towards architecture.
[26]Davies 2004, 219.
[27]Davies 2004, 210.
[28]Davies 2004, 212.
[29]Allen 2000, 31.
[30]Allen 2000, 31.
[31]Allen 1999, 116.
[32]Davies 2018, 62.
[33]Goodman 1968, 220.
[34]Wollheim 1980, 167.
[35]Here, right interpretation is taken as a precise discrimination of the higher-order symbolic functions performed, such as formal (exemplificational) and expressive functions. See Davies 1991, 336-7.
[36]See Goodman 1985.
[37]Binkley 1977, 277.
[38]Davies 2004, 252.
[39]Langer refers to architecture's mode of virtuality as an 'ethnic domain', but this is far the least developed of her accounts of art's various modes of semblance. She also uses the term 'atmosphere', which might usefully be reconciled with a dominant strand within current architectural theory.
[40]Allen 2000, 36.
[41]Goodman 1968, 112.
[42]Goodman 1984, 149.
[43]Goodman 1968, 120-122.
[44]Levinson 1980, 375.
[45]Levinson 1980, 375.
[46]Levinson 1980, 376.
[47]Levinson 1980, 380.
[48]Goodman 1968, 219.
[49]Goodman 1968, 220.
[50]Goodman 1968, 220.

[51]Goodman 1968, 221.
[52]Davies 2004, 249.
[53]Davies 2004, 249.
[54]Goodman 1985, 643.
[55]Not all properties are literally possessed, in that they may be possessed metaphorically. However, Goodman distinguishes between properties that, while literally false, are metaphorically true – such as the Gothic cathedral that 'soars' – and those that are metaphorically false – the Gothic cathedral that 'droops'. Goodman 1985, 646.
[56]Of course, Goodman recognises that works of architecture also symbolise by more complex, mediated chains of reference. Goodman here references Robert Venturi, where exemplification of juxtaposed forms can even give rise to contradictory architectural references that deliberately set out to contravene each other. Such mediated reference can therefore involve both 'homogeneous and heterogeneous chains of elementary referential links', and perhaps even – through direct quotation – depiction. Goodman 1985, 648.
[57]Davies 2004, 253. See, also, Danto 1964.
[58]See, for instance, Dickie 1974. Davies 2004, 251.
[59]Davies 2004, 250.
[60]Davies 2004, 251.
[61]See Stephen Davies 1987.
[62]Binkley 1977.
[63]Davies 2004, 54.
[64]Binkley 1977, 271.
[65]Binkley 1977, 276. Of course, the 'artworld' with regard to architecture is a very different context to that relevant to contemporary art.
[66]Binkley 1977, 276.
[67]Binkley 1977, 276.
[68]Allen 2000, 33.
[69]Allen 2000, 36.
[70]Wilder 2020, xv.
[71]Banham 1966.
[72]St. John Wilson 2001, 112.
[73]The latter is demonstrated by discrepancies between working drawings and finished brickwork.
[74]Ahlin 1987, 171.
[75]Iser 1978, 65.

[76]Iser 1978, 243.
[77]Goodman 1985, 646.
[78]St. John Wilson 2001, 122.
[79]St. John Wilson 2001, 120.
[80]Blundell Jones 2002, 166.
[81]Blundell Jones 2002, 166.

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