Ordinary Language Film Studies

Andrew Klevan

doi:10.58519/aesthinv.v3i2.11945

Authors

Andrew Klevan University of Oxford

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.58519/aesthinv.v3i2.11945

Keywords:

Film-Philosophy, aesthetic criticism, film studies, ordinary language philosophy

Abstract

This essay explains Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP), because it is relatively unfamiliar to those working in the field of Film-Philosophy, and proposes it as beneficial to film study. OLP provides us with a method of philosophising in relation to films that (1) is not theoretical, paradigmatic or thematic, and is therefore potentially unrestrained because it is not a priori or determining; that (2) is context sensitive, proceeding on a case-by-case basis, while also capable of synoptic overview (through connective analysis); that (3) encourages conceptual clarification and responsive articulation in order to present a perspicacious picture of individual films and our experience of them; and that (4) can act therapeutically by uncoupling us from unhelpful linguistic attachments that may restrict, helping us to see anew.

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